This paper finds that the growth and expansion of U.S. cross-listings by firms from emerging markets around the world have facilitated an expansion of cross-border equity flows and overall development of their stock markets during the 1990s. However, these benefits have negative "spillover" effects. Specifically, we find the capitalization and turnover ratios of local-market firms that do not pursue listings on overseas exchanges decline as U.S. cross-listings in the form of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) increase in size and scope. We investigate various possible sources of these negative spillovers. The most important finding is that they are not just confined to the larger, more actively-traded NYSE and Nasdaq listings which are most likely to divert trading activity and investment flows away from the local market. We offer a new interpretation of these findings that suggests that the growth of ADRs neither facilitate nor hinder local market development, but represent an outcome of poorly-functioning local markets. Policy implications are discussed.
The Role of ADRs in the Development of Emerging Equity Markets
Introduction
This paper examines the impact of the growth of international cross-listings of shares on the stock market development of emerging economies. Specifically, we ask whether the large increase in the number of companies from emerging markets that have chosen to cross-list their shares on U.S. markets, typically in the form of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), has facilitated the development of the domestic stock market or has hindered it. The study encompasses twelve Latin American and Asian emerging markets that had a wide variety of experiences in the growth of their ADR programs during the 1990s in terms of pace, breadth and trading activity. Overall, we find that the expanded ADR presence in these markets has fostered stock market development, which we measure as greater cross-border equity flows, higher market capitalization, more listed companies and greater turnover. But, these benefits accrue primarily to those firms that can and do pursue ADR programs, while the size, scope and liquidity of the non-ADR segment of the domestic markets diminish.
Understanding how ADRs and other financial innovations in global capital markets affect stock market development is important for several reasons. First, stock market development is a catalyst for overall economic development. Many notable economists have argued that vital financial markets can lead to greater economic growth by increasing the productivity of capital through greater liquidity, enhanced portfolio diversification opportunities and better information on the profitability of risky projects (Schumpeter, 1911; McKinnon, 1973) . Indeed, there has been an abundance of empirical evidence that stock market development is positively correlated with current and future economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Zervos, 1998a, 1998b; Wurgler, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . Second, in the case of emerging economies which were rapidly liberalizing their markets during the 1980s and 1990s, this positive correlation has been shown to be even stronger. Market liberalization events, such as the easing of regulatory restrictions on foreign ownership or foreign exchange convertibility, have led to greater integration of emerging equity markets with global markets. Greater integration, in turn, has led to improved risk-sharing benefits (Obstfeld, 1992 (Obstfeld, , 1994 Lewis, 1996 Lewis, , 2000 , greater investment activity, higher stock market returns, lower return volatility and higher real per capita GDP growth (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995, 2000; Lundblad, 2001, 2002; Henry, 2000a Henry, , 2000b Kim and Singal, 2000; Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Sloek, 2002; and Martell and Stulz, 2003) .
Third, the impact of international cross-listings and ADRs for domestic stock market development can be unlike many other forms of government-sponsored market liberalization, however, because they are actions initiated by the firms themselves and not mandated by regulatory authorities. As such, they are likely to be made in the best interests of their shareholders and not necessarily the markets, as a whole. There is general agreement on the benefits that accrue to the listing firm in terms of improved access to global capital markets, a broader shareholder base, and enhanced visibility before analysts, media and even consumers and also to the current and prospective investors in terms of increased transparency, better liquidity and greater ease of trading.
1 But, there is little understanding to now of how these cross-listings, in aggregate, impact the local markets. Several possible scenarios could arise and it is their study that is the focus of this paper.
One possible scenario is that the expansion of the ADR market in a country facilitates stock market development by acting as a "catalyst" toward greater efficiency. In this view, as more local firms pursue U.S.
listings, local stock exchanges, their brokers and regulatory authorities feel increased competitive pressure to modernize operations, improve standards of disclosure and strengthen enforcement of trading regulations.
These improvements spur on greater liquidity of trading, increased transparency and efficiency of markets and market intermediaries, which, in turn, attracts more firms to list their shares for trading and more global investors to those markets enhancing liquidity, efficiency and overall development.
Another possible scenario, however, is that the expansion of ADR programs "hinders" stock market development by diverting investment flows and trading activity away from the local market. In this alternative view, there is no competitive response from local market participants leading to further deterioration of operations, diminished trading volume, and fewer new listings and investors. As the quality of the local market declines, increasingly more firms look abroad to opportunities in more developed markets, such as in the U.S. But not all firms can seize upon these opportunities because the stringent foreign listing, registration and reporting requirements imposed by these established exchanges ensure that only the largest and most liquid firms can pursue listings. The result of these ADR issuances is a breakdown of a pooling equilibrium in favor of a signaling equilibrium in which the larger firms with better opportunities signal their higher quality to local and global investors relative to the smaller, marginal firms in the local market, which suffer lower valuations, reduced liquidity and diminished numbers. Instead of acting as a "catalyst" to greater local market development, the ADRs act more as a "hindrance" or "diversion" by driving investment flows and trading activity away from those markets.
A third possibility, and one that we uniquely explore in this study, is that ADRs act as neither a catalyst nor a hindrance for local stock market development, but represent an outcome of it. In this scenario, there are economic, political or institutional forces at work that are the fundamental cause of poorly functioning markets. As a result, the deteriorating quality of the market creates stronger incentives for existing firms to escape by way of international cross-listings. In general, it is difficult to determine the actual direction of causality. After all, even if there is an acceleration of ADR issuances that precede the decline in a local market, it does necessarily imply that this event caused this decline, as these firms may simply have had better information about the future trends toward lower valuations, diminished numbers of new listings and decreased liquidity of the domestic market. Nevertheless, in this paper, we argue in favor of this third scenario over the "hindrance" or "diversion" scenario above and provide empirical evidence in support of it.
Specifically, we show that not only is the growth of ADR programs negatively associated with local stock market development, it is so regardless of the type of ADR program. What are shown to be adverse effects on local-market turnover and valuations arise are just as large when large, high profile ADR listings occur on the major U.S. exchanges as with the smaller, less-actively-traded over-the-counter listings and private-placement issues, even though the latter types have only limited liquidity in the U.S. The similarity of these results across types of ADRs is surprising because it is very unlikely that OTC ADR listings and private placements divert in any significant way economic activity away from the home market.
Studying the impact of ADRs on stock market development is also important because it has grown so rapidly in many emerging markets of Latin America and Asia during the past decade and because it has stoked a controversial policy debate as a result. including more than 600 programs trading around $20 billion annually on the major exchanges.
regardless of the barriers that were in place. 5 Noronha, Sarin, and Saudagaran (1996) , Sofianos and Smith (1997 ), Foerster and Karolyi (1998 , 2000 , Hargis (1998), Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998) , and Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999) , by contrast, demonstrate significant improvements in liquidity due to increased competition for order flow across multiple markets trading the shares, which could also account for the benefits of listing. Cantale (1996) , Fuerst (1998), and Moel (1999) assume widespread information asymmetries among investors, particularly in emerging markets, and suggest that the benefits of a lower cost of capital stems from a signaling equilibrium in which firms that list on markets with high disclosure standards (like the U.S.) can establish their quality relative to their peer firms before global investors and experience significant revaluation of their shares. 6 Finally, Coffee (2002) , Stulz (1999) , Reese and Weisbach (2002), Tribukait (2002) , and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) argue that a U.S. listing enhances the legal protection of a firm's investors and reduces the agency costs of controlling shareholders.
Whatever the sources of the cost-of-capital benefits of international cross-listings to the firms themselves, there are several studies that have demonstrated that these listings in aggregate facilitate greater integration of international capital market (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Errunza, Hogan and Hung, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Hargis, 2002; and, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine, 2002) . Errunza, Hogan, and
Hung, for example, estimate an international asset-pricing model that allows for time-variation in market integration and show that a number of factors are statistically related to higher degrees of integration including the number and composition of international cross-listings. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine estimate a reduced-form model for a number of financial time-series, like stock returns, dividend yields, cross-border capital flows, to search for a common, endogenous break in the process generating the series around market liberalizations. They uncover such common breakpoints and show that events related to the introduction of the first ADR listing from a country are more closely related to those breaks than official market liberalization or other capital-market event dates. 7 These studies, like the current one, are countrylevel investigations, but they focus primarily on the diversification benefits of ADRs for investors and for the integration of capital markets as a whole, and not on the spillover effects on the development of the stock markets.
Our study is most closely related to a select few studies of the "spillover effects" of ADR listings on the domestic stock market development. Most of these studies focus on the impact of trade diversion and migration of order flow to the U.S. markets on the liquidity of ADRs and non-ADRs in the domestic market (Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan, 1998; Hargis and Ramanlal, 1998; Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler, 5 Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2003) and Edison and Warnock (2003a, 2003b) show that U.S. investors prefer to invest in shares of non-U.S. companies with U.S.-based listings in the form of ADRs. 6 Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) , Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) and Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2002) demonstrate significant changes occur in the information environment of the firms that cross-list in the U.S., including increased media and analyst coverage and increased accuracy of analyst forecasts. 7 Edison and Warnock (2003c) show that when an emerging-market firm lists on a major U.S. exchange, it has a statistically significant, though transitory, impact on cross-border capital flows.
2002; Levine and Schmukler, 2003) , but some focus on the impact on stock returns and valuations of non-ADR firms (Lee, 2002; Melvin and Valero-Tonone, 2003) while only one examines broader measures of development (Moel, 2001 show that the migration of trading of "international firms" (which include not only ADRs but also firms that issue equity or debt overseas) to major exchanges has led to a significant diversion of trading away from purely-domestic firms into international firms on the local markets. Claessens et al. show that this diversion of activity is concentrated in those countries with lower incomes per capita, less efficient legal systems and less liquid markets in the first place. Consistent with these broad-based findings, both Lee and Melvin and Valero-Tonone uncover negative "spillover" stock returns for "rival" or "peer" firms with three days around ADR listing announcements.
There are two major contributions of the current paper. First, with the exception of the Moel (2001) study, we evaluate a broad array of measures of stock market development, including the ratio of market capitalization to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the number of publicly-listed firms, overall cross-border equity flows (relative to GDP) and trading activity (measure as the dollar value of trading relative to market capitalization). However, unlike Moel, we measure these development proxies at the firm level and, most importantly, separately for ADR firms and non-ADR firms. This firm-level analysis allows us to isolate the direct effects of the ADR firms themselves from the indirect effects on the other non-ADR firms in the local market. The analysis is also different because it is conducted at monthly (not just annual) horizons in order to be able to better capture the dynamics of the changes in the ADR and domestic markets. To this end, we construct our development proxies by aggregating firm-level data on the number, market capitalization, and dollar value of trading of different firms each month and compile it with information on listing dates for the ADRs from the various exchanges and depositary banks. Unlike the results of the Moel study, our results are consistent across all development proxies identifying adverse spillover effects on market capitalization-to-GDP, the number of listed firms and turnover activity for non-ADR firms. Moreover, the results are robust to a number of controls including official market liberalizations, other capital-market events (like country fund introductions) and even the influence of events like the Asian financial crisis.
The second major contribution of this study is that, unlike all other "spillover" studies to date, we distinguish among the different types of ADR listings from the various emerging markets. That is, we measure the scope, size and trading activity in the larger, high-profile ADRs that list on the major U.S.
exchanges (New York Stock Exchange, NYSE, and Nasdaq) from those smaller ADRs that list and trade as over-the-counter and as private-placement (by means of Securities Exchange Commission Rule 144a) issues.
This distinction is important because over-the-counter listings are typically illiquid and Rule 144a issues trade only among qualified institutional buyers on the PORTAL system. Our central premise is that these alternative vehicles for listing in the U.S. are unlikely to effect as large a diversion of trading activity away from the home market. Yet, we find surprisingly that increasing numbers of Rule 144a and over-the-counter listings are associated with statistically significant effects on ADR and non-ADR firm numbers, valuations and trading that are as large, if not larger, than the impact of exchange-listed ADRs. We offer new interpretations in light of these findings and discuss their policy implications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe and summarize the data on the growth and expansion of ADR programs in our twelve emerging markets. Section 3 presents the stock market development proxies and conducts simple univariate tests for significant changes around official liberalization and major capital-market event dates, including the first major ADR listings. Section 4 presents the main results of the paper and conclusions follow.
The Growth and Expansion of ADR Programs in Emerging Markets
The process that governs how companies from emerging markets cross-list their shares is complex partly because ADRs as financial instruments are varied in form and type and partly because companies choose to employ them in different ways and for different purposes. In this section, we offer a brief primer on ADRs and their different forms. We describe the firm-level data on listings used to measure the growth and expansion of the ADR programs in this study and present some summary statistics.
A Primer on ADR Programs
There are a variety of ways in which firms from around the world cross-list their shares on overseas exemptions and did not need to register fully with the SEC; however, no capital raising activity was permitted. "Level 2" ADRs and capital-raising "Level 3" ADRs register and disclose financial statements exactly as domestic U.S. companies in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and receive wide coverage among analysts and the press (Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver, 2002; Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva, 2003; Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003) .
In April 1990, SEC Rule 144a was adopted. It was designed to serve a number of purposes including increasing the overall liquidity of private placement securities. Private placements are only available to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs), with at least $100 million in securities and registered broker-dealer accounts. These securities trade over-the-counter among QIBs using the PORTAL system. Another purpose of Rule 144a was to provide increased access to U.S. capital markets specifically to non-U.S. issuers, by not requiring them to undergo registration under the 1934 Securities Act. Rule 144a allows non-U.S. issuers to include U.S. tranches in global equity offerings without having to comply with certain disclosure rules.
Data
In this study, three measures of ADR activity are constructed. The first measure is the fraction of the total number of stocks in an emerging market with shares also listed in the U.S. as ADRs. The second measure is the fraction of the total market capitalization of all stocks in an emerging market with shares also listed in the U.S. as ADRs. Finally, our third measure is the fraction of the total value of shares traded in an emerging market with shares also listed in the U.S. as ADRs. Karolyi, 1999 Karolyi, , 2000 . Second, while we do distinguish the ADR programs by type (Rule 144a private placements, OTC listings and major exchange listings) in terms of the count of the number of programs, their market capitalization or value of trading, we do not distinguish capital-raising programs from straight listings. Previous research has shown that important capital-market attributes, such as valuation, trading, and analyst coverage, can be significantly different for ADR programs that are associated with new, public issues (see also Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler, Table 3 ). . 11 An appendix of all ADR listings for the twelve markets is available from the author upon request.
Summary Statistics
Similar cross-sectional patterns across countries arise for MCAPFRAC and VOLFRAC, but, in some cases, there are unusual patterns across the three different measures of ADR activity for the same country. In most countries, the fraction of the market capitalization and value of trading comprised by ADRs is typically higher than the fraction represented by the numbers of firms. This result is intuitive in that only the largest and most actively traded firms are most likely to be able to qualify for listing in the U.S. and it is also consistent with the findings of existing studies (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge et al., 2003) . In the case of Korea, by the end of the 1990s the ADR firms constituted over 50 percent of the market capitalization and 33 percent of the value of trading, though they represented only slightly more than 10 percent in terms of count. Other extreme cases include Brazil, Philippines, and Taiwan A third feature of the data is the different pace with which they were adopted in various emerging countries. To supplement the data in Table 1 
The Impact of ADRs on Stock Market Development
To empirically test the effect of ADR listings on stock market development, we propose four measures of stock market development that have been extensively studied in the literature. In this section, we describe the data used to construct the development proxies, present some summary statistics, and conduct univariate tests for structural changes in these development proxies around key liberalization and capitalmarket events.
Stock Market Development Measures
Four measures of stock market development are constructed. First, the market capitalization ratio (MKTGDP) equals the value of listed shares divided by GDP, both denominated in current U.S. dollars.
Many researchers use this ratio as an indicator of development since stock market size is correlated positively with the ability to mobilize capital and diversify risk. Existing firms' past retained earnings and future growth prospects are also presumed to be embodied in the stock market's capitalization ratio: a higher ratio relative to GDP implies better growth prospects and a more developed market. We follow many studies that have employed this measure for stock market development (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Hargis, 1998; Moel, 2001; Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2001; Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine, 2002; Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . Our second measure of development is a count of the number of publicly traded companies. A number of studies that use this measure (Moel, 2001; Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2001; and Rajan and Zingales, 2003) argue in favor of this measure because it captures the breadth of the stock market without being tainted by fluctuations in stock market valuations. But it can be too slow-moving to fully capture high frequency changes in the environment. The measure will also be affected by the process of consolidation as well as by the industrial structure of markets (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . We divide the count by U.S. dollars Third, the turnover ratio (TURNOVER) equals the value of total shares traded divided by market capitalization. It is not a direct measure of liquidity, but high turnover is expected to signal lower transactions costs. Month-end value of trading is in millions of U.S. dollars and is drawn from EMDB. This have been actively studied in the market liberalization literature on stock market development (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2001; Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine, 2002) and on the few existing studies of ADR market "spillovers" (Hargis, 1998; Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan, 1998; Moel, 2001; Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler, 2002; and, Levine and Schmukler, 2003) . The latter set of studies focuses on liquidity as an outcome measure, but the former set of studies acknowledges a number of weaknesses of liquidity as a measure of development. For example, Levine and Zervos (1998a) contrast turnover with their preferred measure of value traded relative to GDP, which gauges the positive effects of liquidity as a share of national output and thus on an economy-wide basis. But they acknowledge that "price effects" plague this measure because a rise in stock prices will increase value traded even without a change in the number of transactions or a fall in transactions costs. We follow the majority of the studies in using TURNOVER and also compute this measure separately for ADR and non-ADR firms with our firm-level data.
Finally, the capital flow ratio (FLOWGDP) is the total dollar value of monthly gross portfolio equity flows, including purchases and sales of equities from U.S. residents to the emerging market, divided by GDP.
The gross flows are obtained from Treasury International Capital (TIC). 12 Many studies have examined the dynamics of capital flows around liberalization events (Levine and Zervos, 1998b; Bekaert and Harvey, 1995, 2000; Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine, 2002) ; Edison and Warnock (2003c) specifically study the impact of ADR listings from emerging markets on flows. We refer to this as a development measure, but it is better understood as an outcome of development and a facilitator of international financial integration. Unlike some studies, we do not compute net capital flows (purchases less sales of emerging market equity by U.S.
investors), because the duration, timing and magnitude has varied dramatically with economic and stock market cycles during the past decades (Karolyi and Stulz, 2003) . Of course, TIC flows data are aggregated across investors and stocks, so we are unable to construct separate measures of this proxy for ADR and non-ADR segments of the market. There are a number of other important caveats of the TIC flows data including the fact that coverage is limited to U.S. investors (excluding other countries' investments in emerging markets), trades through third countries (possibly through foreign intermediaries) are excluded, as are mergerrelated stock swaps (Edison and Warnock, 2003c) . Table 2 presents data on each of the four stock market development indicators for selected years.
Summary Statistics
Though our data is available on a monthly basis, for many of the flow-based measures, such as annual trading volume, turnover and gross flows (relative to GDP), the statistics are reported on an annualized basis for the year; the stock-based variables like market capitalization and number of listed companies are reported as at year-end. There are a number of interesting patterns across countries and years. Typically, the countries with the largest market capitalization in billions of U.S. dollars, such as Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan, also have among the highest capitalization ratios. For example, Taiwan's $205 billion market represents almost 72 percent of its GDP in 2000. There are important exceptions, such as Chile, for which the capitalization ratio has remained above 60 percent for most of the 1990s, and Malaysia, for which the ratio has even exceeded 12 See http://www.treasury.gov/tic/ticsec.html for data construction. Also, Tesar and Werner (1995) .
over 230 percent prior to the Asian financial crisis in mid-1997. Across most markets, there has been a steady trend upward in the capitalization ratios (MKTGDP), particularly relative to the early period before 1990.
In almost all countries, the number of listed companies has increased substantially, although there are again interesting exceptions. In countries like Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, Philippines, and Korea, the number has doubled or even tripled during the 12 year period of analysis, yet the number of firms in Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela have remained the same, which means relative to GDP (in billions of U.S. dollar, or NUMGDP), they have declined. Part of the problem with this measure is that it is constrained by the eligibility of firms for the IFC Global index and may not be representative of the entire population of publicly-listed firms in those markets on smaller, regional exchanges or those trading over-the-counter. It is unlikely to affect our analysis systematically, however, as the eligibility criteria are applied uniformly across all markets.
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Turnover ratios have remained reasonably steady across the period of analysis for most countries.
Some countries, like Chile and Venezuela, have relatively low turnover (below 10 percent per year) whereas others, like Korea and Taiwan, represent unusual outliers with very high turnover (over 100 percent per year).
There are bursts of trading activity creating some volatility in these ratios. For example, turnover in Argentina averages around 30 percent per year but has swung from 15 percent in 1988, to 90 percent in 1992 and back to around 20 percent for the remainder of the 1990s.
In every country in our analysis, the fraction of GDP comprised of by gross flows has increased. In some cases, like Korea and Taiwan, the expansion of gross flows from the early 1990s to 2000 is six to nine times larger in magnitude. The ratios are low, averaging well below 10 percent, but it is important to remember that the TIC flows data are bilateral (between U.S. and local emerging market residents) and do not include flows between local residents and among other developed and emerging market investors.
An important feature of the monthly time series for each of these development indicators is that they are constructed from trending series, which indicates the possibility of a unit root. Non-stationarity can affect our inferences in tests below because any statistical association with the growth of ADR activity variables uncovered may be spurious. We compute (though do not report) Dickey-Fuller (1979) Instead, we specify our pooled cross-sectional time-series regression models (to be presented in Section 4) with lagged dependent variables and compute Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors with serial correlation correction up to six lags. This transformation is useful not only because it ensures stationarity by construction, but also because it allows each of our stock market development indicators to define its own adjusted monthly growth rates. We elaborate on these issues further in Section 4. Table 3 presents the results of a number of univariate tests for changes in each of the stock market development series around key liberalization and capital-market events. For each country, we identify the official liberalization dates from Table 2 of Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002) . These dates typically include regulatory events related to changes in foreign ownership restrictions or the relaxation of currency conversion restrictions (e.g. Resolution 51 in February 1991 in Colombia). We also report tests of changes around the introduction of the first country fund (also, from Table 2 With some exceptions, inferences about the impact of the different liberalization and capital-market events on the stock market development indicators are quite consistent and of similar magnitudes. This is not surprising given how clustered many of these events across these countries. 14 Interesting exceptions include TURNOVER in Argentina, for which there were statistically significant increases following official liberalization and country fund introduction in 1989 and 1991, but no significant changes following the ADR introductions of Alpargatas (OTC) in 1992 and BAESA (NYSE) in 1993. Similar divergences occur in TURNOVER for Philippines, Taiwan, and Venezuela, but these results stem from unusually early liberalization dates, such as for Venezuela, or country fund introduction dates, as for the other two countries.
Tests of Structural Change in Stock Market Development
Overall, Table 3 provides evidence that there are significant advances in these stock market development indicators, notwithstanding the limitations that each of these indicators face in terms of construction or with their interpretation. We also see that the changes in capitalization ratios, numbers of listed firms, their turnover and overall gross flows are similar across different liberalization events. As a result, in the following analysis, we introduce our monthly measures of ADR activity and test for a statistical association with the development indicators only after controlling for these other liberalization and capitalmarket events.
Results

Estimation Methodology
In this section, we investigate the influence of the ADR activity variables on the stock market development proxies using a multi-country, multivariate analysis. We specify and estimate a pooled crosssectional time-series regression model of the development indicators, y it :
The ADR activity variables, x it , are projected onto the indicator variables and we control for a number of other factors, z it , which may be related to development. The coefficients associated with these ADR and control variables are common across countries. In estimation, we allow for fixed effects by setting a different intercept, α i , for each country. In some specifications, we have constrained the intercept to be constant across countries to infer the average monthly value of the indicator variable of interest. Because some of our development indicators, like MKTGDP and NUMGDP, are close to non-stationary series, we allow for a lagged dependent variable, y it , in the specification, and because the degree of potential non-stationarity in these indicators varies across countries, we allow the coefficient, δ i , on the lagged dependent variable to be different (although, in some tests, we also impose that they are equal).
Panel data can be well-suited for examining dynamic effects like the first-order model (1), but substantial complications arise in estimation. One difficulty in such a fixed-effects setting is that the lagged dependent variable may be correlated with the disturbance, even if it is assumed that ε it is not itself autocorrelated. Greene (2000, Section 14.7) shows how the estimator may not unbiased though it is consistent, although he points out the problem is more severe in a random-effects specification than in a fixed-effects specification like ours. Ahn and Schmidt (1993) propose a general instrumental variables estimator that allows for differences (y it-1 -y it-2, y it-2 -y it-3 ) or lagged levels (y it-1 , y it-2 ) as candidate instruments to alleviate the bias. They argue that the level of y is likely uncorrelated with the differences of disturbances one or two periods (months) subsequent. We, therefore, include up to six lags of the levels of the development indicators and also compute Newey-West (1987) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors with serial-correlation corrections up to six lags. Table 3 and are from Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002) . Second, we follow Bekaert (1995) and Edison and Warnock (2003a) and compute a measure of openness (denoted OPENNESS) as the ratio of the market capitalization of the constituent members of the IFC Investible and the IFC Global indexes for each country. This variable measures the extent to which the stocks in a market are available to foreign investors. For each development indicator, we estimate a simple specification with each control variable separately and then proceed to add each of the three ADR activity variables to the base model in turn.
Overall Results
The results for MKTGDP (top-left panel) are generally weak. None of the control variables or ADR activity variables is significant. This is surprising given the findings in Table 3 This factor thus explains about 20 percent of the overall growth in gross flows as a fraction of GDP (Table 2) during this period, which totals about $4 billion of the $21 billion increase in gross flows in dollars.
Isolating the Impact of ADR Activity on the Domestic Stock Market
One important concern with the tests in Table 4 is that the measures of financial development, such as the number of listed firms, their market capitalization and turnover, include the ADR firms that are also in the ADR factor proxies. It is not an unreasonable first approximation as they, as well as the non-ADR firms that trade exclusively in the local market, do capture the overall vitality of the stock market. But, it may be useful to focus attention on those companies that do not list ADRs in the U.S. The key hypothesis of this paper, after all, describes a scenario in which growth in ADR programs can represent a "catalyst" for expansion of the local market in terms of number, capitalization and liquidity through existing companies, but also through the attraction of new companies to the local market. Table 4 , we found negative coefficients on the ADR factors for NUMGDP overall; however, in Table 5 , significantly negative coefficients from all three ADR factors are consistently obtained for the non- 16 The results of this supplementary exercise are most closely related to those of Moel (2001) , Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2002) , and Levine and Schmukler (2003) , but they focus only on turnover and not market capitalization and numbers of listed firms. The comparisons are not easy, however. For example, Claessens et al. separate their analysis into "international" and "domestic" firms which is closely related to ADR and non-ADR firms, but could also include those that raise capital abroad without a U.S. listing.
ADR firms, while those for the ADR firms are all positive. The adverse impact on non-ADR firms is robust to inclusion of the control variables LDATE and OPENNESS for which the coefficients remain significant and negative, also. The impact of ADR factors on TURNOVER for ADR and non-ADR firms provides the most interesting evidence. In the case of TURNOVER for the non-ADR firms, the control variables, LDATE and OPENNESS, have positive coefficients that are statistically significant while the coefficients on the ADR factors, NUMFRAC and VOLFRAC, are significantly negative. For the ADR firms, the turnover ratio is increasing overall (unreported positive intercept coefficients), but not in a way that is related to these ADR factors or control variables. For example, the positive coefficient on OPENNESS in model (1) for non-ADR firm TURNOVER is 0.0438 (t-statistic of 3.95), but, when NUMFRAC is added to the regression as in model (3), the coefficient on OPENNESS increases to 0.0775 (t-statistic of 4.21) and that on NUMFRAC is -0.1153
(t-statistic of -4.24). A unique interaction arises between OPENNESS and NUMFRAC or VOLFRAC for non-ADR firms and provides an important new implication: non-ADR turnover, like that of ADR firms, rose over our period of study, but the rate at which it rose was slower than for ADR firms and this slower rate of growth is correlated (negatively) with the expansion of the ADR markets.
Does the Type of ADR Listing Matter?
Not all types of ADR listings are the same. As discussed in Section 2, the most prominent U.S.
listings are Level 2 and 3 ADRs, which involve exchange listings on the NYSE and Nasdaq. But there are many companies from these emerging markets that pursue Level 1 OTC listings and Rule 144a private placements to access U.S. markets. These alternative listing types have fewer and less stringent reporting and registration requirements, but they are typically less actively traded, have more limited ownership in the U.S., attract fewer analysts and generally have lower investor profiles. Most papers that study the ADR market do uncover significant differences among different types of ADRs for capital market reactions around listings (Miller, 1999; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999) , capital-raising activity (Foerster and Karolyi, 2000) , for valuation (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2003) , and for disclosure activity (Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003; Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva, 2002) . In this section, we investigate whether the impact of the ADR market factors for various development measures of the local market stems primarily from these higher profile exchange listings or whether all types of U.S. listings make a difference. We reconstruct the ADR factors (NUMFRAC, MCAPFRAC, and VOLFRAC) based on the three types for each country and introduce them as separate variables using the same specifications as in previous sections. These results are surprising. The fact that the statistically significant and economically important coefficients of these ADR factors for stock market development are similar across the different types of ADR listings leads us to ask whether the ADR factors are as much an outcome of market conditions as a cause of it.
It is unlikely that Rule 144a private placements and OTC ADR listings can divert as much trading activity and investment flows away from the domestic market as exchange listings can as they are not very actively traded and limited to institutional investors. We offer this evidence as consistent with an alternative to the diversion hypothesis, advocated by Hargis and Ramanlal (1998), Moel (2001) , Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2002) , and Levine and Schmukler (2003) . We propose that the scope, size and trading activity in the domestic (non-ADR) market may be declining for fundamental economic, political and other institutional reasons, to which many firms in those markets respond by seeking out listings in whatever form that is available to them. Smaller, illiquid stocks in these markets may not be able to qualify for the listing standards of the major exchanges and will have to pursue OTC listings or Rule 144a issues. Larger, more liquid stocks will qualify for the major exchanges and will have choices among listing types available to them. The result is a breakdown of a pooling equilibrium in favor of a signaling equilibrium in which the larger firms signal their quality by listing ADRs enjoying higher valuations and enhanced liquidity at the expense of smaller firms which suffer reduced liquidity and lower valuations. We can also interpret this evidence as supportive of signaling models of the ADR issuance process introduced by Cantale (1996) , Fuerst (1998), and Moel (1999) .
Robustness Tests
We incorporate a number of alternative specifications to evaluate the robustness of our findings, which are available upon request. One set of tests examines the sensitivity of our basic inferences associated with the ADR factors to different numbers of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments in our pooled cross-sectional time-series model. All of the results reported above use six lags, but we re-estimate the model with only three lags and one lag, respectively. Most of the basic results of Table 4 remain with small changes in the coefficients and their statistical significance. Most importantly, there does not appear to be any systematic pattern to these variations across lag-length specifications that might suggest a problem with biased coefficients that can stem from the cross-autocorrelations in the residuals and the independent variables (Ahn and Schmidt, 1993) . To address this concern further, we also adjusted the number of lags allowed in the Newey-West (1987) covariance matrix and found little change in the inferences. Finally, we introduced a specification that lagged all the NUMFRAC, MCAPFRAC and VOLFRAC variables by one month and even included specifications with up to three lagged values. In these tests, we found that the magnitude and significance of the coefficients on the lagged ADR factors declined with longer lags. Although their effect was weaker, the basic patterns were similar to those with the contemporaneous factors. A richer analysis of the joint dynamics of these development indicators and the ADR factors would represent a useful extension to the current paper.
A second set of tests evaluated the potential explanatory power of other factors that might influence development. We are especially concerned about the perturbing influence of the Mexican peso crisis in late 1994 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997. We construct country-specific dummy variables that equal one for months in which the individual stock market returns are larger in absolute value than 25 percent. The stock index returns are the IFC Global index returns from the EMDB database and are denominated in U.S.
dollars. We find that the crisis dummy variable is statistically significant and negative in the MKTGDP regressions and significant and positive in the TURNOVER regressions. Crisis periods with large absolute stock returns were associated large declines in capitalization and large increases in turnover activity across these twelve countries. The dummy variable is not significant for either the NUMGDP or FLOWGDP specifications. More importantly, in spite of these important influences for capitalization and turnover ratios, the basic results associated with the ADR factors remain. Another possible influence is the introduction of other capital-market instruments that may facilitate stock market development by helping global investors diversify into emerging markets. We employ the same event-date dummy variable associated with the country fund introduction from Table 3 , which we originally obtained from Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002) .
We include it in the place of LDATE in our specifications of Table 4 . Overall, the coefficients associated with the country-fund introduction are weaker than for LDATE, but, more importantly, we find that the inferences in regards to the ADR factors are not changed.
Conclusions
This paper finds that the growth and expansion of ADR programs in emerging markets around the world facilitated an expansion of cross-border equity flows and overall development of the stock markets in those countries. However, the development was uneven across the different stocks in those markets.
Specifically, we find the capitalization and turnover ratios of those domestic firms that do not pursue listings on overseas exchanges decline significantly as ADRs grow in importance in the local stock market in terms of numbers listed, their market capitalization and their trading volumes. These results at first glance appear consistent with the view that ADR programs help to divert trading activity and investment flows to the U.S.
markets at the expense of other firms in the domestic market. That is, though ADRs spur on overall stock market development, they also create negative "spillovers" on the liquidity, valuations, and breadth of the domestic market.
However, when we examine in greater detail the potential sources of these spillovers, we find evidence that is not necessarily consistent with this "diversion" hypothesis. We specifically distinguish ADR programs by type, separating out the potential influence of smaller and less-liquid OTC listings and Rule 144a private placements from the larger, actively-traded exchange listings on the NYSE and Nasdaq markets.
Surprisingly, we find that the negative spillovers associated with these smaller ADR listings are as statistically and economically large as with the larger high-profile ADR programs in spite of the fact that they do not trade very actively in the U.S. and are restricted to institutional investors. We offer an alternative interpretation of this new evidence that is different from other studies of the spillover effects of ADR programs to the local market (Hargis and Ramanlal, 1998; Moel, 2001; Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler, 2002; Levine and Schmukler, 2003; Lee, 2002; and, Melvin and Valero-Tonone, 2003) .
We suggest, by contrast, that the growth and expansion of ADR markets in these emerging economies may be an outcome of the declining market conditions and not a cause of them. It is possible that fundamental economic, political, legal or other institutional forces are contributing to the deteriorating quality of the local markets and that these poorly functioning markets are creating incentives for firms to leave. Of course, the larger firms are able to escape these markets by qualifying for ADRs in the U.S. thereby enjoying higher valuations and enhanced liquidity, while the smaller firms suffer lower valuations and reduced liquidity. This alternative hypothesis is important because it has a very different policy implication for market regulators, for companies and for investors in these emerging markets. ADR programs, in and of themselves, do not necessarily divert investment flows and trading activity away from the local market. Rather, their growth and popularity may simply be the outcome of poor economic policies, weak legal protections of shareholders and lack of transparency that are leading to poorly functioning stock markets.
It is important to caution readers of several limitations of the current study. The scope of analysis is limited to only twelve emerging markets from Latin America and Asia during the 1990s, which is a relatively short time period. Also, we only study four measures of stock market development. One important extension of this study would be to incorporate a longer historical analysis with capital market data from developed markets. ADR programs in Europe, and especially the U.K., France, Netherlands, Sweden and Italy, grew dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s and were similarly associated capital market liberalization activity, such as the Thatcher government privatizations of British Gas, British Telecom and British Airways.
Another extension would be to examine other possible outcome measures of stock market development. While proxies for the overall size and liquidity of the markets and cross-border capital flows are useful, it would be interesting to consider measures of the efficiency of the markets, including equity and debt issuances, IPO activity, and the size and presence of the financial services sector. It may also be helpful to broaden the analysis to examine the potential impact on overall economic growth. A third extension would refine the horizon of analysis. In this study we examine monthly data on stock market development and the ADR programs and their activity. Our analysis has made us aware of important dynamics in these variables, but we do not investigate sufficiently the rich joint dynamics potentially underlying these time-series. A multivariate simultaneous equation system may be a fruitful econometric specification to consider.
Finally, our measures of ADR activity are narrow and ignore important institutional facets of global equity markets that need to be reconciled. For example, the ADR variables consider only activity in the home market. This distinction is important because some ADR programs from emerging markets are associated with greater trading activity, broader ownership geographically and more aggressive capital-raising activity, while other programs are dormant. We also focus only on the economic impact of cross-listings in the U.S.
markets by way of ADRs. While the U.S. is where most of the activity has occurred over the past decade for firms (Pagano, Roell, and Zechner, 2002; Sarkissian and Schill, 2002) , it would be important to consider the broader impact of cross-listings in other major markets, such as Tokyo, Singapore, and London. 
Table 1 Summary Statistics for Measures of Growth in ADR Activity
Statistics for monthly data on three measures of the growth of the ADR market in each emerging market. They are: (1) NUMFRAC, the fraction of total number of stocks included in the IFCG Global index for each market which have ADRs listed in the U.S.; (2) MCAPFRAC, the fraction of the U.S. dollar market capitalization of the IFCG Global index for each market that is represented by the market capitalization of the ADRs listed in the U.S.; and (3) Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002) . The four development measures are: (1) MKTGDP, the month-end market value of all listed shares divided by GDP (both in current U.S. dollars); (2) NUMGDP, the month-end number of all listed companies divided by GDP (in U.S dollar billions); (3) TURNOVER, the annualized monthly value of trades divided by market capitalization (both in current U.S. dollars), and (4) FLOWGDP, the annualized monthly gross equity flows between U.S. and emerging market residents divided by GDP (both in U.S. dollars millions). The (2002); NUMFRAC, the fraction of total number of stocks included in the IFCG Global index for each market which have ADRs listed in the U.S.; VOLFRAC, the fraction of U.S. dollar value of trading in the IFCG Global index for each market that is comprised of trading in ADRs listed in the U.S.; and MCAPFRAC, the fraction of the U.S. dollar market capitalization of the IFCG Global index for each market that is represented by the market capitalization of the ADRs listed in the U.S. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent obtained from Newey-West procedures; statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels are denoted by * and ** , respectively. We allow the country-specific intercepts and country-specific coefficients on six lags of the dependent variable. Our sample runs from December 1989 to September 2000 (130 observations).
Model
(1) (2002); NUMFRAC, the fraction of total number of stocks included in the IFCG Global index for each market which have ADRs listed in the U.S.; VOLFRAC, the fraction of U.S. dollar value of trading in the IFCG Global index for each market that is comprised of trading in ADRs listed in the U.S.; and MCAPFRAC, the fraction of the U.S. dollar market capitalization of the IFCG Global index for each market that is represented by the market capitalization of the ADRs listed in the U.S. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent obtained from Newey-West procedures; statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels are denoted by * and ** , respectively. We allow the country-specific intercepts and country-specific coefficients on six lags of the dependent variable. Our sample runs from December 1989 to September 2000 (130 observations).
(1) Tables 2 & 3) are run on various factors related to market liberalizations and development of the ADR markets. The development variables for MKTGDP, NUMGDP and TURNOVER are computed only for non-ADR firms; FLOWGDP is for the market as a whole. The three ADR activity measures (NUMFRAC, the fraction of total number of stocks included in the IFCG Global index for each market which have ADRs listed in the U.S.; VOLFRAC, the fraction of U.S. dollar value of trading in the IFCG Global index for each market that is comprised of trading in ADRs listed in the U.S.; and MCAPFRAC, the fraction of the U.S. dollar market capitalization of the IFCG Global index for each market that is represented by the market capitalization of the ADRs listed in the U.S.) are computed separately for Rule 144a private placement issues, over-the-counter (OTC) listings and Level 2/3 major U.S. exchange listings. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent obtained from Newey-West procedures; statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels are denoted by * and ** , respectively. We allow the country-specific intercepts and country-specific coefficients on six lags of the dependent variable. Our sample runs December 1989 to September 2000 (130 observations).
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Figure 2 Market Capitalization of Stocks Listed Overall and as ADRs by Country
